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Introduction
Suppose you decide to raise your arm. Who is the agent that wills and 
brings about the movement?—Is that you in reality? In this article, I will 
critically evaluate Bishop George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) argument 
of voluntary motion in human body parts. Rather than internal organs, 
by ‘human body parts’ I mean the parts of the body that are movable by 
muscles, such as limbs and eyelids, under the voluntary control of one’s 
mind. In his early days (1707–1708), Berkeley spelt out that ‘We move 
our Legs our selves. ’tis we that will their movement’ (Notebooks 548).1 Do 
our minds, then, really bring about the movements in our body parts?—
 1 With the exception of Notebooks, I reference Berkeley’s text from the Luce-
Jessop edition. The following abbreviations are used: Notebooks x for Notebooks (also 
known as Philosophical Commentaries), entry x (the Thomas-Luce edition); Principles 
x for Part I of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, section x (Works 
II); Dialogues x:y for Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, dialogue x, page y 
(Works II); Correspondence 1729/30:x for Philosophical Correspondence between Berkeley 
and Samuel Johnson 1729–30, section x (Works II); Alciphron x:y for Alciphron, or the 
Minute Philosopher, dialogue x, section y (Works III); De motu x for De motu sive de mo-
tus principio & natura, et de causa communicationis motuum, section x (Works IV, Luce’s 
translation); Siris x for Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries, section 
x (Works V). Berkeley’s original emphasis is in italics, unless otherwise indicated.
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Or does God do so? When we decide to move our legs, our minds seem 
to cause the subsequent bodily motions. However, is such mind-body 
causation at all possible? Parsing out this human problem in relation to 
the divine cause, I will divide the interpretations of Berkeley commenta-
tors into two types. Firstly, many commentators read Berkley as claim-
ing that God always moves our legs, on behalf of our wills to do so. 
Yet, secondly, others contend that humans do have the volitional, causal 
power to move our own legs. I will argue that the second and literal 
interpretation dovetails more consistently with Berkeley’s original sug-
gestion.
The first type of interpretation (by Jolley, Taylor, Bennett, et al.2 is 
a version of occasionalism. This is a doctrine that allows for no causal 
power of finite minds/spirits, but only that of God. On this occasionalist 
reading, even if we have our own will, God brings about the (effects/ideas 
of) movements in our legs because God is regarded as the first and single 
cause that brings about physical effects on the occasion of our volitions. 
The second type (in which I include Roberts, Stoneham, and Fleming)3 is 
a version of conservationism, as an alternative interpretation to the occa-
sionalist reading.4 I will side with the conservationist reading, according 
to which finite minds directly or immediately cause the motions in their 
body parts at will under God’s sustenance of the existence and prop-
erties of their bodies.5 This reading is conducive to a sense of realism 
 2 Jolley 1990; Taylor 1985; Bennett 2001.
 3 Roberts 2007; 2010; Stoneham 2002; 2010; forthcoming; Fleming 2006.
 4 One might rather consider three scholastic types of reading. See McDonough 
2008, 568–72; Schmaltz 2008, 16–19, 36–44; Freddoso 1988, 77–78, 104; 1991, 553–555; 
1994, 132–135. Besides ‘mere conservationism’ (in Freddoso’s term) and ‘occasionali-
sm’, the third reading is called ‘concurrentism’ (causal compatibilism or creaturely 
action working together with God), embraced by popular scholastics such as Thomas 
Aquinas (1225–1274) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). According to the doctrine, 
Berkeley may hold mind-body causation that the primary divine cause and secondary 
causes (or finite minds) co-operate to will and thereby bring about the effects (ideas) 
of bodily motions. However, I aim to show that the third concurrentist reading can be 
sufficiently subsumed under the non-occasionalist or conservationist reading of the 
creaturely voluntary motion. This is because I read Berkeley as arguing that human 
minds have the secondary but immediate causes insofar as we direct and move our 
own body parts, even under the first but distant divine cause. This does not necessar-
ily amount to an accurate concurrence between the minds of God and humans, putting 
aside two premises of the divine creation and conservation. See also Stoneham forth-
coming, 4–5, nn. 5, 7; Frankel 2015, 105, 113, n. 16.
 5 On (mere) conservationism, Berkeley’s Correspondence to his American disciple, 
Samuel Johnson, ought to be examined (1729:3): ‘the divine conservation of things is 
equipollent to, and in fact the same thing with, a continued creation … and Durandus 
… held the world to be a machine like a clock, made and put in motion by God, but 
afterwards continuing to go of itself, was therein particular, and had few followers. 
… all nature would shrink to nothing, if not upheld and preserved in being by the 
same force that first created it. This I am sure is agreeable to Holy Scripture’. On the 
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regarding mind-body causation by our own acts of volition, somehow 
independent of the divine mind. By interpreting (i) theodicy and (ii) an 
account of influencing other minds in line with the conservationist read-
ing, I will take a further step in also considering (iii) the existence of an 
improper but necessary directing principle in the faculty of finite minds. 
From these three perspectives, I will argue that Berkeley is a conserva-
tionist, rather than an occasionalist, with regard to mind-body causation 
by human agency to the extent of moving body parts.
This article is accordingly broken down into three sections. §I briefly 
presents what occasionalism is and then explains the occasionalist read-
ing of voluntary motion in Berkeley. §II, by contrast, elaborates on the al-
ternative possibility of the non-occasionalist or conservationist reading. 
Finally, §III evaluates the two interpretations by comparing their merits, 
and argues why the conservationist reading is more successful than the 
occasionalist one.
I. Occasionalism
On the whole, the commentaries divide into two types of reading: 
(1) the occasionalist reading and (2) the non-occasionalist or conserva-
tionist reading. In fact, many of the commentators read Berkeley’s argu-
ment of voluntary motion from an occasionalist viewpoint, i.e. attribut-
ing no causal power to human minds but only to the divine mind. This 
I call the occasionalist reading of human voluntary motion in body parts, 
such as limbs. Considering some striking points in Berkeley, this section 
will first review that reading.
Since the early stage of his career, Berkeley had been criticised for his 
doctrinal affinity with the occasionalism of Père Nicolas de Malebran-
che (1638–1715).6 In effect, right after his early publications (1709–1713, 
mechanical example of ‘the clockwork of Nature’ and ‘watchmaker’, see Principles 
60–62. Siding with the Works II editor, T.E. Jessop, I read Berkeley as explaining the 
view of an unpopular scholastic philosopher, bishop Durandus de Saint-Pourçain 
(c.1270–1334). Furthermore, in my view, it may be the case that Berkeley himself, as 
one of his ‘few followers’, conceded Durandus’ conservationism in terms of the crea-
turely voluntary motion which is not immediately caused by God. In other words, 
creatures are held liable for the immediate voluntary motions in their body parts. As 
for Durandus’ (and other scholastics’) conservationism, see Freddoso 1991, 555; 1994, 
142–151; Schmaltz 2008, 19–24; Frost 2014, 656–658, n. 4.
 6 Occasionalism has been associated with theological tenets of e.g. Abu Hamid 
al-Ghazali (1058–1111) and Solomon ibn Gabirol (c.1021–c.58) in the Middle Ages, 
deriving from Neoplatonic roots. Their versions of occasionalism precede the seven-
teenth-century occasionalism of e.g. Claude Clerselier (1614–1684), Louis de la Forge 
(1632–1666), and Malebranche. See Schmaltz 2008, 9–16, 121–124; Richmond 2009, 
89–90; Freddoso 1988, 76–79.
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such as Principles, Passive Obedience, and Dialogues), Berkeley came to be 
seen as a Malebranchean occasionalist; he was labelled a Malebranchiste 
de bonne foi in the French Jesuit academic journal, Mémoires des Trévoux 
(1713).7 Commentators have since paid considerable attention to the sim-
ilarities between the two philosophers, claiming that Berkeley was an 
occasionalist or Malebranchist to a certain or great degree.8 
In the first place, I shortly introduce Malebranche’s occasionalism, 
for Berkeley himself was concerned about the alleged affinity with that.9 
As an occasionalist, Malebranche held that God’s volitional power was 
the only true cause for the existence of creatures in nature, as follows:10 
there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the 
nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natu-
ral causes are not true causes but only occasional causes. 
 7 Bracken 1965, 16. 
 8 Berkeley might be portrayed as part of the occasionalist development, as Bard-
out (2002, 492) explains: ‘l’histoire de l’occasionnalisme … ne se confondrait pas avec 
celle des sources du malebranchisme, mais aussi bien, quoique pour d’autres motifs, 
avec celle d’une postérité sans doute inattendue, comme en témoigne la transposition 
berkeleyanne’. See also Charles 2004, 73–88; Fritz 1954, 572; Lee 2012, 575; Downing 
2005, 209; Hight 2017, 198–99, nn. 2–4. Sukjae Lee clearly argues for Berkeley’s oc-
casionalism whilst discerning it from Malebranche’s one, whereas Lisa Downing and 
Marc Hight call for Berkeley’s semi-occasionalism in the sense that God is the sole 
true cause of bodies for finite minds in the physical realm but their volitions are not 
powerless in the spiritual realm. However, this article does not have enough room for 
discussing all sorts of occasionalist interpretation (Lee and other recent commenta-
tors).
 9 More explicitly than with the ontological theory of occasionalism, Berkeley dis-
agrees with Malebranche’s epistemological theory of vision in God. Against ‘the en-
thusiasm of Malebranche’, Berkeley, in the person of Philonous, argues in Dialogues 
2:214: ‘in truth I am very remote from it. [Malebranche] builds on the most abstract 
general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. … I entirely agree with what the holy Scrip-
ture saith, that in God we live and move and have our being.’ The italics (original empha-
sis) here, or the Pauline doctrine about our causal dependence on God, is Berkeley’s 
quote of Acts 17:28. The rest of the verse shows St Paul’s quote of the Stoic poet Ara-
tus’ Phaenomena, verse 5: ‘For we are also his offspring’ (KJV). Besides this Dialogues 
2:214, one can find the same quote in e.g. Principles 66, 149; Dialogues 3:236; Alciphron 
4:14; Guardian Essay no. 88 (‘The Christian Idea of God’, Works VII, 219); The Theory 
of Vision Vindicated and Explained § 2 (Works I); Notebooks 827. From the fact that both 
Malebranche and Berkeley often quote the italics part, A.A. Luce infers that Berke-
ley can ‘agree with that part of Malebranche’s philosophy’. Luce goes on to argue 
that Malebranche’s Search formed Berkeley’s metaphysical system of immaterialism 
(1967, 83; Principles 6). Here I do not side with Luce, whereas, when they frequently 
quote Acts 17:28, I think both Berkeley and Malebranche might have realised the Stoic 
essence in this verse. On the possible Stoic influence upon Berkeley’s philosophy, see 
Daniel 2001, 179, nn. 1–3; 2008, 207–09, 215, 228, n. 30.
 10 Malebranche 1997, 448 (The Search after Truth, VI, pt. 2, ch. 3).
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This indicates that created beings cannot cause their actions for 
themselves without God’s causal, volitional power, which I take as the 
divine efficient cause. Thus, creaturely volitions are occasional causes for 
God that truly brings about the efficacy of motions. Put another way, 
occasionalism regards the wills of creatures as occasions for God to act. 
When God is the first and sole cause for us, we ourselves cannot be sec-
ondary causes but only the occasional causes for divine operation.
Berkeley considers these features of occasionalism in Principles 53. 
Whilst not explicitly mentioning Malebranche here, Berkeley criticises 
‘some of the Schoolmen’ and ‘modern philosophers’ for their ‘very unac-
countable and extravagant supposition’, even ‘though we should allow 
it possible’. Malebranchean occasionalism can be implied as one of the 
modern philosophers. The occasionalist ‘supposition’ of them could be 
formulated in Berkeley’s argument:11
(1)  matter exists, but is causally inert or inactive, for ‘there are no 
corporeal causes’.12
(2)  none but God has the power or activity for ‘producing any one 
effect in Nature’.
(3)  matter is a sole, immediate occasion (i.e. occasional cause) for the 
divine ‘power or activity’.
Therefore,
(4)  matter is merely an occasional cause (not the real cause), on which 
occasion God acts as ‘the immediate efficient cause of all things’. 
(Principles 53)
In this occasional causation or occasionalism, the conclusion (4) fol-
lows the three premises at least. The conclusion highlights the passivity 
of matter existing in nature (premise 1), since corporeal beings are merely 
occasional causes for God’s efficient omnipotence (premises 2–3). It may 
be suggested that Berkeley rejected the second premise as regards the 
divine sole cause. However, only if all that exist are matter and God does 
the second premise follow from the first one. The point is Berkeley’s dis-
claimer specifically against the first premise, and the occasionalist con-
 11 See also Richmond 2009, 90. 
 12 See the first mention of matter in the Principles: ‘the very notion of what is called 
matter … involves a contradiction in it’ (Principles 9). On the analysis of defective con-
ditions of ‘matter’ as the object of all cognition in Berkeley’s system, see e.g. Ferrier 
2001, 397–99, 489–92; Keefe 2007, 103. See also De motu 71: ‘second corporeal causes 
ought to be understood, no account being taken of the actual seat of the forces or 
of the active powers or of the real cause in which they are.’ Douglas Jesseph regards 
this part not allowing for any active power or real cause of matter, as ‘very similar to 
the occasionalist thesis’ (1992, 106, n. 46). 
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clusion therefrom. It is clear, therefore, that Berkeley tried to avoid the 
connection to the doctrine of occasionalism in his immaterialist system.
Nonetheless, despite the criticism of his precursors’ occasionalist 
supposition, a number of commentators take Berkeley to be an occasion-
alist. For instance, Nicholas Jolley argues that:13
even in his mature philosophy, Berkeley remains something of an occa-
sionalist; although he no longer holds that finite spirits are impotent, at 
least with respect to physical processes (my emphasis) Berkeley continues to 
teach that true causality must be ascribed to God alone.
As for the processes of bodily motions, Jolley here claims that Berkeley’s 
argument is ultimately occasionalist, even though Berkeley would not 
qualify it. This is because God is the single true cause in the motion of hu-
man bodies, such that Berkeley appears to be held ‘in the grip of a Mal-
ebranchean argument’.14 One’s volitional acts are merely the occasional 
causes of the intended bodily motions, on which occasions God solely 
and really operates his causal omnipotence on one’s body.15 Therefore, 
Jolley builds his reading on this passage below about the causal depen-
dence of one’s will on God, in Principles 29:
whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actu-
ally perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will (my empha-
sis). When in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is not in my power to 
choose whether I shall see or no (my emphasis), … There is therefore some 
other will or spirit that produces them.
Here one needs to read with care the distinction between perception 
and motion in bodies. Properly speaking, the (sense) perception is a pas-
sive reception of ideas that occurs whether or not one wills, intends, or 
wishes to perceive. For instance, depending on the weather changing, 
the eye perceiving the day light outside is not necessarily related to one’s 
will to do so. This is because, according to Jolley, the sensory ideas are 
causally independent of one’s volitional power.16 Whereas the motion 
in body parts, putting aside some automatic reflex action (e.g. knee jerk-
ing), is directly caused by the will or volitional power (e.g. moving legs 
 13 Jolley 1990, 230. On a similar interpretation, see Pitcher 1981, 221–27. In support 
of Berkeley’s ‘unqualified occasionalism’ (Jolley 1990, 232), given his mentions of ‘oc-
casional causes’ as signs, Jolley references Principles 31, 65; Correspondence 1729:2. 
On the other hand, Jolley bewares of non-occasionalist points on one’s volitional 
power of moving one’s limbs in De motu 25; Siris 161. I will treat the latter citations 
in §III.
 14 Jolley 1990, 230.
 15 Jolley (1990, 233) here sides with Taylor (1985, 222).
 16 Jolley 1990, 233; Principles 29.
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to walk outside, be it in the dark or in the day light).17 However, it is 
not the case when the physical motion is restricted by the initial sense 
perception (e.g. because of too dark a room, one cannot see without any 
light and therefore not freely walk inside). Then, it can be read in the 
above passage that, independent of the will of one’s mind, ‘some oth-
er will or spirit’, namely God, exercises one’s sense perception and the 
following physical motion.18 On the occasionalist reading like Jolley’s, 
our human wills could be merely regarded as the occasional causes for 
God’s operation in the human perception and bodily motion. 
Secondly, C.C.W. Taylor also reads Berkeley as claiming that physi-
cal motion is not caused by one’s own but by God’s volitional power. In 
fact, in the standard reading of Berkeley’s philosophy of action, one can 
find the association with occasionalism from many commentators’ argu-
ments. This is what Taylor calls ‘the occasionalist theory of volitions’, 
irrespective of Berkeley’s argument against occasionalism.19 According 
to Taylor, one’s volitions act as if ‘petitions, expressive of desires which 
we ourselves are powerless to put into effect, but which God in his 
goodness actualises on our behalf’.20 As for this divine occasionalism, to 
which Berkeley seems to be reverted, I reconstruct Taylor’s argument as 
follows:21
(1)  ‘the ideas imprinted on the senses are not creatures of my will’, 
such that we have no causal power over them. (Principles 29)
(2)  the real world is composed of the ideas that appear to our minds 
through the senses. (Principles 33–34)
(3)  our minds have, by exercising the will, no causal power over the 
ideas of the real world. (from 1–2)
However,
(4)  ‘I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and 
shift the scene … It is no more than willing, and straightway this 
or that idea arises in my fancy.’ (Principles 28)
Therefore, 
(5)  despite the internal activity of the will (mental faculties at will), 
we are impotent in the external, real realm. (from 3–4)
 17 In Berkeley’s subtle definition, the mind/spirit/soul/oneself is the will as a pow-
er; it is not directly the volition as an act. See e.g. Notebooks 478a, 621, 699, 849; Prin-
ciples 2; Dialogues 3:240; Correspondence 1729:2.
 18 See also Principles 148: ‘whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times 
and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the divinity: everything we see, hear, 
feel, or any wise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the Power of God; as is 
our perception of those very motions, which are produced by men.’
 19 Taylor (1985, 222) particularly considers occasionalism in Berkeley from Dia-
logues 2:220; Principles 68–72.
 20 Taylor 1985, 222–23.
 21 Taylor 1985, 213.
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In the above reconstruction, also given God as the only cause of bodi-
ly motions, the occasionalist reading can be inferred: i.e. no external or 
real movements are caused by human minds. In this Berkeleian world 
of ideas perceived by the senses, as Taylor concludes, ‘we are made for 
action, but condemned to inaction’.22 For one can but presuppose the 
other will, or the divine one, to ensure the perception of ideas in the ex-
ternal realm. The controlling state of the will is limited to one’s internal 
imagination and thought, to the extent to which the human mind can 
invoke ideas at pleasure or at one’s disposal. In this occasionalist key, 
thus, the wills of finite minds are inefficacious for exciting or causing 
ideas of the intended physical motions.
As is clear in Taylor’s argument, it is important to interpret the re-
lationship between willing minds and perceived ideas in terms of vol-
untary motion. On the occasionalist reading, not until human minds 
(or spirits) depend on the divine omnipotence can their intended physi-
cal changes be fully explained as real, or as perceived ideas, in the out-
side world. As shown in Principles 147:23
There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, 
which doth not more strongly evince the being of that spirit who is the 
Author of Nature. … He alone it is who upholding all things by the Word of his 
Power, maintains that intercourse between spirits, whereby they are able 
to perceive the existence of each other.
This suggests that the natural or human world is upheld or sus-
tained by the divine power so that we can consistently perceive the ideas 
of things and actions, including our physical motions.24 Therefore, only 
by the sustenance of God (or ‘the Word of his Power’) does ‘that inter-
course between spirits’ lead to the perception of each other’s existence. 
On the other hand, simultaneously, Taylor warns us of a theological 
challenge of occasionalism, in cases where the Author of Nature may 
bring about sinful bodily motions.25 Theologically, one cannot claim that 
God should force us to commit sin. Here Taylor argues that Berkeley 
does not sufficiently resolve this problem, for the occasionalist frame-
work is prone to be undermined by ascribing human guilty causes to 
God. Whilst I will later consider this problem in theodicy, Taylor regards 
Berkeley as an occasionalist so as to answer why human wills are in-
 22 Taylor 1985, 225.
 23 Taylor 1985, 220. See also Principles 150.
 24 See also Lee 2012, 551–552; Principles 34: ‘All things that exist, exist only in the 
mind, that is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and 
stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our 
own bodies?’ (Lee’s and my emphases)
 25 Taylor 1985, 223; Dialogues 3:236–237; Correspondence 1729:2.
79Berkeley on Voluntary Motion: A Conservationist Account
ert in invoking real ideas in the external realm. Indeed, but for God’s 
causal power, as Berkeley states, ‘no point in physics is explained … nor 
is it conceivable’.26
Finally, in the light of volitional impotence of human minds, Jona-
than Bennett similarly finds a version of occasionalism in Berkeley. Ben-
nett carefully examines Dialogue 2:220 where Berkeley (his mouthpiece 
Philonous) argues for God’s causal power that makes the human mind 
perceive ideas:27 
I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our 
ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently accounted for by the 
wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from those 
attributes to suppose he is influenced, directed or put in mind when and 
what he is to act, by any unthinking substance. 
On Bennett’s reading of this passage, Berkeley theologically utilises 
the doctrine of occasionalism as one of the solutions to argue against ma-
terialism of ‘any unthinking substance’.28 In this context, God alone can 
orderly and regularly maintain the course of nature composed of ideas, 
whereas thinking that we humans do instead of God would ‘derogate 
from’ the divinity. This reading amounts to occasionalism, in the sense 
that all ideas that our minds have are brought about only by the divine 
mind. There, in defence of Berkeley’s own immaterialism, occasionalism 
might answer why ideas of bodily motions, not matters per se, are caused 
by the divine power. Despite Berkeley’s criticism of his precursors’ oc-
casionalist supposition (Principles 53), according to Bennett, Principles 
67–72 also confirm that there are no extra-mental ‘occasions’ for inert 
and passive matters, for only the ideas can exist in the mind. 
Certainly, Bennett agrees with the existence of our will but denies 
that our mental, volitional acts are the causes of bodily motions. Accord-
ing to him, it is ‘a gift from God’ so as to enjoy one’s voluntary move-
ments of body parts, and therefore:29
Berkeley, it seems, must conclude that when I voluntarily clench my fist, 
I actively perform a mental act—a volition—and that the rest of what hap-
pens falls outside the scope of my activity. That would imply that the 
modest claim that ‘We move our legs our selves’ (Notebooks 548) is wrong 
(my emphasis): we do not move our legs; rather, we will that our legs 
should move, and then, usually, our legs move.
 26 Correspondence 1729:2.
 27 Bennett 2001, 141–142.
 28 Bennett 2001, 142.
 29 Bennett 2001, 166.
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From here one can see Bennett arguing that, even though we humans 
will that the moving of our limbs shall happen, nothing but God can bring 
about our voluntary movements that are the divine gift. In other words, 
no matter how we will to move our body parts, our acts of volition are 
occasionalistically inefficacious for the occurrence of any ideas of bodily 
movements. Thus, the wills of human minds are merely the occasional 
causes for God to actually cause the movements, on behalf of ourselves.
To conclude, one might concur with Jolley, Taylor, and Bennett that, 
for Berkeley, the human mind cannot realise one’s volition to move body 
parts in the external or real realm. Putting aside one’s chimeric (non-real) 
imagination in the internal realm, the occasionalist reading is possible to 
the effect that our minds are voluntarily inefficacious as the occasional 
causes. Thus, on occasions of the wills of our minds, God solely causes 
real ideas of our physical motions. But the question at issue is whether 
Berkeley really denies our own mental, volitional power in causing bodi-
ly motions. Now, another type of reading of voluntary motion without 
reference to occasionalism is worth reviewing.
II. Conservationism
On another reading of Berkeley, one’s volition is deemed not occasional-
ist or an occasion for God’s causal, volitional power. In other words, this 
reading shows that one could positively have a genuine causal power 
to move body parts at will, at pleasure, or at one’s necessary disposal. 
I label this alternative reading ‘conservationism’, the realism about one’s 
immediate volitional cause under the divine conservation. That is, hu-
man minds are causally independent of God’s omnipotence in bringing 
about ideas of their own motions, yet under the dependence on God.30 
This reading, therefore, sheds more light upon Berkeley’s theory of ac-
tion, interpreting bodily motions as the immanent and direct effects or 
ideas by one’s acts of volition. In this second section, I will explain three 
commentators’ views towards the non-occasionalist or conservationist 
reading.
Firstly, John Roberts objects to the occasionalist reading that ne-
gates one’s own voluntary motion.31 His objection is not that the read-
ing is entirely false, but he is rather sceptical about the compatibility 
 30 The problem of causal independence of and dependence on God should be 
carefully discussed, whilst this article delves into the former independence case as 
realism or (mere) conservationism.
 31 Roberts (2010, 412, n. 3) labels the reading inclined to occasionalism (of Jolley, 
Taylor, and Bennett) as ‘the Standard Interpretation’ that contains the problem of our 
voluntary motions in body parts, from e.g. Notebooks 107 (‘unperformed wills, these 
having no power at all’), 548; Principles 29 (see Taylor’s argument in §I).
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between Berkeley’s theory of action and the doctrine of occasionalism.32 
For Berkeley seems to claim that our volitional acts bring something 
about in the external world. ‘To say ye Will is a power. Volition is an 
act. This is idem per idem’ (Notebooks 621). To this extent, Roberts con-
strues that Berkeley takes the power of will to be the activity of volition 
in the case of human minds, finite or ‘limited and dependent’ beings 
(Dialogues 3:240–41).33 From here, differing from the occasionalist read-
ing, one could infer that the volitional power of one’s mind is to actively 
bring about ideas of bodily movements within one’s limit given by God. 
For instance, one can usually walk because God gave the proper ability 
within the limit of human activity, but one cannot fly because God did 
not give that ability.
Then, Roberts shows an alternative to the standard occasionalist 
reading of voluntary motion. His reading primarily stems from the in-
terpretation of Berkeley’s key sentences in his early notebooks (1707–08) 
that attract (and bother) commentators. That is Notebooks 548:
S. We move our Legs our selves. ’tis we that will their movement. Herein 
I differ from Malebranch.
Even if not his official view due to the unpublished Notebooks, Berke-
ley here clearly draws the line between his and Malebranche’s views 
of voluntary motion.34 Berkeley contradicts the occasionalist perspective 
in arguing that humans do will and thereby move their body parts, e.g. 
legs and fingers. 
On this point, Roberts argues that the will does not strictly have the 
power to produce ‘motion’, but merely ‘action’ as the volition in one’s 
immanent acts.35 For he considers Berkeley’s point that ‘motion being 
allowed to be no action’, one cannot ‘conceive any action besides vo-
lition’ (Dialogues 2:217).36 Following Roberts’ reading, then, the human 
will seems to immanently bear the causal power to generate one’s action, 
even if one may not properly perceive the entailing bodily motion. To that 
effect, however, it is not necessary to assume occasionalism in Berkeley’s 
 32 Roberts 2007, 111–23; 2010, 413.
 33 Roberts 2007, 107; 2010, 414, 430; Notebooks 478a, 637, 791 (‘I am eternally, con-
stantly willing, my acquiescing in the present State is willing’); Principles 89 (minds/
spirits are ‘active, indivisible, incorruptible substances’).
 34 Malebranche, by contrast, does not take the human ‘immanent power’ of voli-
tion as anything powerful. See Roberts 2010, 415, 419–422; Malebranche 1997, 551 
(‘Elucidation One’ of The Search): ‘All we do is stop and rest … by an immanent act 
that produces nothing material in our substance.’
 35 Roberts 2010, 415, 419.
 36 Roberts 2010, 415–416; Correspondence 1729:4 (‘all guilt is in the will’); Dialogues 
3:236–237, Alciphron 7:19.
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treatment of the creaturely movements in their body parts insofar as per-
forming the acts of volition.
Secondly, Tom Stoneham discusses Berkeley’s view of voluntary 
motion, primarily from a non-occasionalist or conservationist perspec-
tive. For his own thesis, Stoneham claims for Berkeley’s ‘causal-voli-
tional realism about action’ from e.g. Notebooks 548, Principles 145–46, 
Dialogues 1:196, 3:237, De motu 25.37 By this realism, Stoneham indicates 
that our embodied actions by moving body parts are real or essentially 
independent of divine mind, so that human minds are causally and vo-
litionally responsible for their actions.38 In this regard, pace Stoneham 
(and also Roberts), it might be circular to state that one’s volition causes 
the embodied action, if the volition is defined in terms of its action.39 
This realist account of volitional embodiment or mind-body causation, 
therefore, might require a more logical reinforcement of the connection 
between volition and action in Berkeley.
Nonetheless, Stoneham does not decisively take this realism, or 
what I mean by conservationism, as the single available option in view 
of the historical Berkeley. He admits another possibility that God might 
be responsible for all the movements in bodies, from e.g. Principles 30, 
Dialogues 2:212–14, De motu 34. Thus, whilst he finds realism ‘philo-
sophically interesting as a version of immaterialism’, Stoneham does 
not discard other interpretations such as occasionalism (viz. no causal 
power for human minds) and concurrentism (viz. causal co-operation 
or compatibilism between divine and human minds).40 Yet, between the 
 37 Stoneham forthcoming, 2–10.
 38 According to Stoneham (forthcoming, 1–2, nn. 1–2; 2002, 40–41), Berkeley’s 
realism (conservationism) about action is also based on his realism about sensible 
qualities or ideas (e.g. pains), the existence of which he cannot empirically doubt 
(i.e. anti-sceptic). Although they are mind-dependent, except for imagination (chime-
ric non-reality), ‘sensible things … depend not on my thought’ (Dialogues 2:212). Then, 
to the extent that sense experience in one’s mind is realistic, one’s action through the 
embodiment is also realistic, because ‘We are chained to a body, that is to say, our 
perceptions are connected with corporeal motions’ (Dialogues 3:241).
 39 I very much thank Richard Brook for pointing out this circular problem (and 
for much more criticism) in the earlier draft.
 40 On the division of labour between the divine and creaturely causes in co-oper-
ating/concurring in their production, see e.g. Principles 66, 145. On the concurrentist 
reading alternative to the standard occasionalist one, see note 4 above; McDonough 
2008, 572–580; Baier 1977, 391–395; Dancy 1998, 56. In his introduction to Principles, 
Dancy suggests the possibility of joint agency which is virtually concurrentism, or 
‘the idea that God combines with us so that together we can do what neither of us 
could have done alone’. On the other hand, Baier concedes that her account of the 
concurrent movement that ‘divine and human intenders could work together with-
out sharing purposes or goals would be deeply repugnant to Berkeley’s religious 
instincts’ (1977, 394). But according to Stoneham, the concurrentist reading stands 
‘against occasionalism, and thus can equally be wheeled out by the realist’ or (mere) 
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two interpretations of occasionalism and realism, he assesses that ‘each 
has its own costs … Berkeley the anti-atheist would have been attracted 
by occasionalism and Berkeley the anti-sceptic by realism’.41 Admittedly, 
there might be no fixed consensus on this issue of voluntary motion.42 
The above reservation notwithstanding, Stoneham points out two 
compelling reasons for favouring conservationism over occasionalism: 
(i) Berkeley’s theodicy, and (ii) his account of other minds/spirits.43 On 
theodicy, defending God’s immediate cause/action of all actions against 
sin, Berkeley (as Philonous) argues in Dialogues 3:237:
I have no where said that God is the only agent who produces all the motions 
in bodies (my emphasis). It is true, I have denied there are any other agents 
beside spirits: but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking ratio-
nal beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers (my 
emphasis), ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under 
the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all 
the guilt of their actions. 
This captures the point on our own agency that produces motions 
in bodies. For Berkeley considers that God bestows ‘limited powers’ 
to human finite spirits or agents, by attributing the causes of all sinful 
actions (stemming from ‘motions in bodies’) to our own wills.44 There-
fore, Stoneham dismisses the possibility of occasionalism on this point. 
That is, for the sake of theodicy, human minds are not necessarily the 
occasional causes, but sufficiently the real causes to be liable for sin-
ful actions. Berkeley recognises our own sin and, thus, such a deed 
(e.g. gluttony by willing to eat too much).
Moreover, on account of knowledge of other minds, the movements 
of one’s body parts or limbs are not simply restricted within one’s own 
perception. The impressions of one’s actions can extend to someone 
else’s experience of perceiving (e.g. visualising) them. For example, to 
conservationist (forthcoming, 4). In this sense, I assume that the conservationist read-
ing sufficiently subsumes concurrentism but embraces more than that, for it is not 
necessarily a concurrent causation with God when ‘our mind at will can stir and stay 
the movements of our limbs’ as the ‘principle of motion’ (De motu 25).
 41 Stoneham forthcoming, 2, n. 4.
 42 As Stoneham (forthcoming, 25) and many commentators mention, if we were 
able to read Part II of the Principles of Human Knowledge on the free will problem of hu-
man (and divine) minds, the scholarly consensus on voluntary motion would radi-
cally change. But Berkeley (accidentally) lost the manuscript of Part II in Italy, and 
never wrote it up again. On his planning of a series of Principles, see e.g. Notebooks 508: 
‘Mo. The 2 great Principles of Morality. the Being of a God & the Freedom of Man: 
these to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book.’
 43 Stoneham 2002, 178–214; 2010, 498–501; forthcoming.
 44 See also Falkenstein 1990, 435–436.
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see someone walking in front of me suggests that it is that person, not 
God somewhere, who directly influences my perception of the idea 
of the person’s walking. This point may appear to beg the question for an 
occasionalist, for in the occasionalist reality it is always God that brings 
about one’s perception. Nevertheless, by moving our own limbs, our 
minds intend and in effect cause the impressions that the other human 
minds can have. As in Principles 147:
For it is evident that in affecting other persons, the will of man hath no 
other object, than barely the motion of the limbs of his body (my emphasis); but 
that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any other (Stoneham’s 
addition)45 idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the 
Creator.46 
The context of this passage (partly cited in Taylor’s argument in §I) 
is explaining why the existence of God, or the Author of Nature, is more 
evidently perceived than that of human agents. If only focusing on the 
last sentence, it prima facie suggests that our bodily motions in sense per-
ception are entirely dependent on God’s will and acts of volition. How-
ever, according to Stoneham, under the condition of divine sustenance 
of human actions, one’s volition of bodily motions (e.g. willing to kick 
a man by raising one’s leg) is causally influential in exciting the per-
ceived ideas of another person’s mind (e.g. the pain in the man’s body).47 
In altering someone’s sense modalities, one can observe in the course 
of nature that it is not God but a human particular agent that generates 
a congeries of ideas about physical motions. Otherwise, we may expect 
divine miracles in perception, but Berkeley does not assume them be-
tween human minds. Hence, for these two reasons––(i) theodicy and (ii) 
affecting the mind of another––in Stoneham’s reading of causal-volition-
al realism, one’s volitional acts for physical motions are not occasionalist 
in Berkeley.
Finally, Patrick Fleming offers another conservationist reading sim-
ilar to that of Stoneham. Certainly, Fleming objects to the association 
of occasionalism with Berkeley’s metaphysics. But he does recognise 
 45 Stoneham 2010, 500. On another interpretation (i.e. without the addition 
of ‘other’) of Principles 147, or the perception of one’s body within only oneself, see 
Ayers 1970, 96.
 46 The remainder of Principles 147 is also quoted in Taylor’s argument in §I above.
 47 Stoneham (2010, 501) infers in the following, supposing that ‘I form the volition 
to raise my arm (something I know I have the power to do). The effect of this volition 
will be my arm rising. My arm rising is just a series of ideas. Some of these ideas are 
perceived by me, and some are perceived by others. So, by directly causing my arm 
to rise, I have directly caused other people to perceive certain ideas.’
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that God is interpreted as the ‘sole and immediate’ cause of all the mat-
ters including human body parts by pointing to Berkeley’s remarks:48
In [the Holy Scriptures] God is represented as the sole and immediate 
Author of all those effects, which some heathens and philosophers are 
wont to ascribe to Nature, matter, fate, or the like unthinking principle. 
(Dialogues 3:236)
For in whom we live and move and have our being. (Acts 17:28 in Dialogues 
3:236 etc.) 
The latter quote is the so-called Pauline doctrine that Bishop Berke-
ley often quotes.49 Both of these biblical remarks, in effect, lead to no 
causal necessity of human active agents in bringing about ideas of bodily 
motions.50 After all, one may still read the bishop’s commitment to oc-
casionalism.
Fleming, nonetheless, argues that it may be philosophically superfi-
cial to deem God to be the only agent for physical movements. Rather, 
Berkeley seems to regard human (inferior and improper) agency as be-
ing compatible with the superior and proper agency of God as the cre-
ator and sustainer of the material world.51 Under this condition, Fleming 
affirms that humans do act for themselves, as Berkeley states that the hu-
man will has ‘no other object, than barely the motion of the limbs of his 
body’ (Principles 147).52 Fleming thus claims that:53
On Berkeley’s account man exercises his will and, under proper (my em-
phasis) conditions, God makes sure the object of the willing is noticed by 
other agents properly placed to be affected by it. … God is the sustainer 
of the world; He maintains causal laws that insure humans can act (my em-
phasis); He sets down these laws at the moment of creation, which is 
compatible with allowing humans the ability to act. 
Accordingly, Fleming construes the human acts of volition as com-
patible with God’s proper sustenance of causal laws of nature, which en-
 48 Fleming 2006, 416–417.
 49 See note 9 above, on the bishop’s number of citations of the Pauline doctrine.
 50 See also Siris 257: ‘The true inference is that the self-thinking individual, or 
human person, is not the real author of those natural motions. And, in fact, no man 
blames himself if they are wrong, or values himself if they are right.’
 51 By this compatibility between God and human agency, Fleming (2006, 416–417) 
does not infer concurrentism between the minds of God and humans.
 52 Fleming 2006, 419. Mentioning the other textual evidence, e.g. Principles 33, 148; 
Dialogues 2:218–219, 3:237, Fleming was cautious where ‘Berkeley uses the language 
of action without discussing agency’ (2006, n. 15).
 53 Fleming 2006, 416, 420, n. 18.
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sures and enables human bodily movements. It may be observed that 
Fleming’s claim for God’s (mere) conservation of the world as the ‘causal 
laws that insure humans can act’ requires the more rigorous textual evi-
dence in Berkeley, with regard to the extent to which the divine laws 
of nature cover voluntary motions by human minds. However, given the 
divine sustenance, Fleming’s argument for the creaturely voluntary mo-
tion under the divine conservation augments Stoneham’s reading and 
citations.54 In the next section, I will further bear in mind Fleming’s criti-
cism of the occasionalist reading.
Thus far, I reviewed that the alternative conservationist reading 
could critically differ from the standard occasionalist one, in acknowl-
edging (ideas of) physical motions caused by finite minds under the 
divine maintenance. Concurring with Stoneham, Fleming, and even 
Roberts, I will champion the conservationist interpretation of Berkeley’s 
view of voluntary motion by the human mind. For this purpose, the 
next and final section shows my evaluation of the two types of reading 
of Berkeley’s consistent position.
III. Evaluation
Could one, in the end, award the palm to either of the two readings: 
occasionalism, on the one hand, and non-occasionalism in the sense 
of conservationism, on the other? The two readings could offer different 
interpretative rewards, but each at some cost.55 In this final section, I will 
evaluate why the conservationist reading offers the greater philosophical 
merit than the occasionalist one. For this aim, I will structure my argu-
ment in three steps: putting forward 1. why I disagree with the occasion-
alist reading, 2. why I endorse the conservationist reading, and 3. how 
my reading develops and reinforces the latter conservationist reading by 
considering the faculty of willing in a finite mind as its principle.56 
 54 As for Berkeley’s theodicy or problem of evil, Fleming and Stoneham converge 
on Dialogues 3:237, where Berkeley attributes ‘all the guilt of their actions’ to the im-
mediate human volitions. See Fleming 2006, 427; Stoneham’s point (i) above; Corre-
spondence 1729:4.
 55 See also Stoneham forthcoming, 2. As to why I do not consider the concur-
rentist reading, see notes 4 and 40 above.
 56 In terms of a faculty of willing, in Berkeley’s sense, it cannot be abstracted nor 
distinguished from one’s notion or self-knowledge through reflection. See e.g. Alci-
phron 7:5, 7:18, 7:21 (‘such terms as power, faculty, act, determination, indifference, 
freedom, necessity, and the like … stood for distinct abstract ideas: and that this sup-
position seems to ensnare the mind into the same perplexities and errors, … I am con-
scious that I am an active being, who can and do determine myself’); note 17 above; 
Harris 2010, 342–43, 348; Grzeliński 2017, 188–190. James Harris then stresses that the 
self-consciousness as willing or volition is ‘not to be understood as awareness of an 
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Firstly, I will account for my disagreement with the occasionalist 
reading. The occasionalist reading does involve a cost of its interpreta-
tion. According to Christian belief (as Berkeley was an Anglican Bishop), 
human beings are sinners by nature, to the effect that doctrines of Incar-
nation and Atonement are required.57 But simultaneously, humans are 
the proper subjects of moral judgement, lest God be the author of our 
evil, sinful bodily motions. From the point of Christian theodicy, as Tay-
lor and others worry, it is impossible for Berkeley to accept the neces-
sity that God should cause sinful effects/ideas of physical movements. 
Rather, as seen in Stoneham’s argument in §II, all sins are immediately 
wrought by the sinner’s will or human agency (Dialogues 3:237). It is true, 
the historical occasionalists, Malebranche included, actually prevented 
this problem in theodicy.58 But Berkeley tried to detach his theological 
metaphysics from his interpretation of occasionalism of his precursors 
(Principles 53, 67–72; Dialogues 3:236–237). In the light to theodicy, there-
fore, the occasionalist reading does not offer the textual affinity with 
Berkeley’s view of sinful voluntary motion.
Furthermore, as for the cost of occasionalism, the case is not only 
about sinful actions, but also about natural events composed of human 
bodily motions. On this point, Fleming criticises Taylor’s occasional-
ist reading.59 Siding with Fleming, I think that Taylor problematically 
assumed that Berkeley’s metaphysics ‘allows no role whatever for hu-
man agency’ from the reasoning that humans ‘are absolute in the in-
ternal realm, impotent in the external realm’.60 As I reconstructed Tay-
lor’s internal-external distinction of human volition (from Principles 
28–34) in §I, his version of Berkeley cannot afford humans’ own moving 
of body parts in the external world. In fact, not charitably, Taylor’s argu-
ment partially rests on some arguable points in Berkeley. For he refers to 
these entries of Notebooks:61
autonomous power possessed by the will itself’ (2010, 350). I agree on this point. ‘The 
Will not distinct from Particular volitions’ (Notebooks 615), such that my conserva-
tionist reading does not regard the will as one’s mental faculty generating further 
volitions but merely as ‘the notion of the soul’, mind or spirit (Principles 144). In the 
notion of the human mind, then, I read Berkeley as including the faculty of willing or 
directing the motions in body parts, whereby an ‘embodied’ existence of the human 
mind bears the ‘notion of spirit from thought and action’ together with the opposed 
‘notion of body from resistance’ (Siris 290).
 57 Plantinga 2015, 141–142.
 58 The occasionalist Malebranche, in contrast to Berkeley, eschews the problem 
in theodicy concerning the evil and sinful acts, by appealing to the sinner’s particular 
will without God’s general will. See Schmaltz 2017.
 59 Fleming 2006, 419–24.
 60 Taylor 1985, 211, 213.
 61 Taylor 1985, 220, 225.
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† Strange impotence of men. Man without God. Wretcheder than a stone 
or tree, he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed 
wills, these having no power at all. (Notebooks 107)62 
† One idea not the cause of another, one power not the cause of another. 
The cause of all natural things is onely God. Hence trifling to enquire 
after second Causes. This Doctrine gives a most suitable idea of the Divin-
ity. (Notebooks 433)
These entries that posit God as the first and single causal power can 
be indeed congenial to occasionalism, although, in my view, Berkeley 
kept a distance from it. If this is the case, we must admit that Berkeley 
appreciates the doctrine of occasionalism as most fitting to the divine 
function. On the occasionalist reading, he might have held the view that 
no-one but God can solely bring about the real ideas of one’s physical 
motions. In Notebooks, however, I think that these quotes could be con-
ditioned by the obelus mark (†) at the beginning of entries.63 Even if 
not conventionally treating it as a sign that Berkeley finally rejected, one 
should be mindful of this mark before deciding if they are his unequivo-
cal claims. Likewise, the occasionalist reading based on those parts of his 
text could therefore be conditioned, whether Berkeley argued for or 
against human voluntary motion.
On the other hand, as I also reviewed in §I, Bennett explicitly judged 
that it was ‘wrong’ to insist that ‘We move our Legs our selves’ (Notebooks 
548). Bennett explicated the reason: ‘we do not move our legs; rather, we 
will that our legs should move, and then, usually, our legs move’.64 This 
account does indicate occasionalism, to the extent that God solely causes 
one’s physical motions on behalf of one’s will to cause. But here, I also 
concur with Fleming’s criticism directed to Bennett’s occasionalist read-
ing, for the conservationist reading is more textually and philosophically 
viable.65
Secondly, then, I will explain why I favour the conservationist read-
ing in Berkeley that human minds do act for their voluntary motions. 
This is first textually correct, by underlining Berkeley’s points on human 
 62 This entry is the central objection that Roberts (2010, 423–26) tried to resolve, 
even though the volitional power here appears anaemic (i.e. impotent to move body 
parts).
 63 Some scholars claim that entries with the obelus/dagger/plus mark cannot be 
rejected and underappreciated in the whole 888 entries of Notebooks in his early 20s 
(1707–1708). For discussion, see McKim 2005, 65, n. 3; Belfrage 1987, 220, 226–227.
 64 Bennett 2001, 166.
 65 Fleming 2006, 426–428.
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voluntary action and physical motion, e.g. ‘the will of man hath … the 
motion of the limbs of his body’ (Principles 147, quoted in §II).66
I contend, specifically against Bennett (and so Taylor, Jolley, et al.) 
that the occasionalist construal cutting one’s will and actual bodily 
movement is not philosophically correct. In other words, pace Bennett, 
it is not wrong to think that one’s volition leads to the intended physical 
motion under the sustenance of divine agency. On my conservationist 
reading, even ‘though (if we may believe Saint Paul) he be not far from 
every one of us’ (Principles 150; Acts 17:27), God is not supposed to direct 
and bring about a finite mind’s immediate voluntary motion. As Berke-
ley clearly explains in De motu 25: 
our mind at will can stir and stay the movements of our limbs, … and ac-
cordingly the mind can be called, correctly enough, a principle of motion, 
a particular and subordinate principle (my emphasis) indeed, and one which 
itself depends on the first and universal principle.
This captures the crucial point that the human mind is deemed 
a particular principle of motion being subordinate to the divine prima-
ry, universal principle.67 That is, human minds, as the inferior agents 
(or principles), can produce effects/ideas of physical motions for them-
selves. This is achievable under the conditions given by God, the divine 
first principle or law of nature.68 On this point, I take the conservationist 
reading, because human agents as particular principles of motion have 
active volitions to directly order and move their body parts (legs, fin-
gers, eyelids, etc.),69 insofar as their limited powers are sustained by God. 
 66 Fleming 2006, 419. Besides Principles 147, Fleming’s own reading highlights 
Principles 33, 148; Dialogues 2:218–219, 3:237.
 67 Moreover, Passive Obedience (Works VI) is noteworthy, for Berkeley argues that 
‘most moral precepts do presuppose some voluntary actions (my emphasis), or pacts 
of men’ (§ 25, see also §§ 14, 33), even though ‘“Thou shalt not resist the supreme 
power” a rule or law of nature’ (§ 15, see also §§ 3, 17, 53). In this moral discourse, hu-
man minds are assumed to be obedient or subservient to the divine principles or laws 
of nature, but I think that Berkeley here does not discard the voluntary motions of hu-
man rational agency. For more discussion of moral volitions and actions in Passive 
Obedience and Alciphron, as the intentional behaviour view (cashing out the volitional 
component of a volition-behaviour pair), see Frankel 2015, 113. It should be noted 
that Melissa Frankel does not take a ‘conservationist’ interpretation for mind-body 
causation in human moral action, but rather she posits Berkeley somewhere neutral 
between the ‘occasionalist’ and ‘concurrentist’ readings (as long as divine power is 
always required for human voluntary motion).
 68 See Dialogues 2:219: ‘We indeed, who are beings of finite powers, are forced to 
make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument sheweth the agent to be lim-
ited by rules of another’s [i.e. God’s] prescription’.
 69 On active volitions of human minds, see e.g. Notebooks 643; Alciphron 7:8; Harris 
2010, 346–348.
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On the contrary, the occasionalist reading reaches an impasse, because 
it cannot dismantle why Berkeley keeps considering the cases for our 
inherent and immediate voluntary movements in bodies under God’s 
control. 
However, one of the interpretative problems connected with conser-
vationism is, as Annette Baier critiques, that Berkeley fails to provide 
a sufficient answer to the question of how divine and human volitions (or 
intentions) and modes of bringing about are interrelated.70 Moreover, as 
Michael Ayers observes, Berkeley fails to clarify the distinction between 
‘voluntarily imagining one’s leg moving’ and ‘voluntarily moving a leg’, 
because ‘in the latter case the ideas that constitute the leg-moving would 
have to be both voluntary and, being “real”, involuntary’.71 Should we, 
then, accuse Berkeley of these philosophical missteps?—I suppose not. 
It is true that Berkeley does not fully analyse the interactions between 
divine and human minds, nor does he account for their effects or ideas 
constructed by their voluntary-involuntary actions. Nonetheless, these 
do not mean that Berkeley necessarily failed to account for the creature-
ly voluntary motion (by e.g. jettisoning the completion of Part II of the 
Principles).72
Concerning the cost of the conservationist reading, then, Berkeley’s 
schema of causal relation between divine and human minds may be 
jeopardised. This is because the conservationist realism cannot signify 
the extent to which God influences the physical movements by the crea-
turely immediate acts of volition.73 On the standard occasionalist read-
ing (by Jolley, Taylor, Bennett, et al.), by contrast, Berkeley seems to have 
little problem in this theological respect by taking refuge in the Pauline 
tenet that ‘in God we live and move and have our being’ (Acts 17:28). 
That is, presupposing the entire dependence of human minds on the di-
vine cause, the occasionalist reading does not entail theological errors 
about the perception of real ideas in the external world. For in this case, 
it is always God that really brings about ideas of physical motions in the 
external world.
Nevertheless, away from the association with occasionalism, we 
could advocate the viability of the conservationist reading that Berkeley 
kept arguing for voluntary motion by the human mind. In addition to 
Roberts and Fleming, as reviewed in §II, I agree with Stoneham’s (real-
ist) conservationist reading from the two points of view: (i) theodicy and 
(ii) the account of influencing other minds. From these perspectives, one 
may be sufficiently able to embrace that reading. However, I think that 
 70 Baier 1977, 413.
 71 Ayers 1993, xxxi.
 72 See note 42 above.
 73 Plantinga 2015, 133–35.
91Berkeley on Voluntary Motion: A Conservationist Account
Stoneham’s reading is not an all-things-considered argument against 
occasionalism, for there can be one more important point of view that 
textually and philosophically reinforces the conservationist reading: (iii) 
a directing principle stemming from the faculty in the human mind at 
will. The clue is by analogy between the minds of God and humans. 
To my knowledge, this point is undervalued in Berkeley literature, but 
I consider it significant in terms of the necessary principle in human vo-
litional acts.
Thirdly and finally, I will clarify in what way my reading further 
supports the conservationist reading. This is to answer why humans can 
will and thereby cause our physical motions within the purview lim-
ited by God. From my point of view, (iii) the directing principle of the 
human willing should be more appreciated. As seen above, De motu 25 
explained the very point that the human mind at will (or at one’s dis-
posal) was the particular and subordinate principle of physical motion. 
Here in addition, I delve into specific sections in his later work, Siris 
(1744). There, Berkeley claims that ‘In the human body the mind orders 
and moves the limbs’ (Siris 161). In support of this claim, provided that 
Berkeley argued for the sake of his own philosophy,74 my explanatory 
focus is upon the prior section in Siris:
The mind of man acts by an instrument necessarily. The τὸ ἡγεμονικόν,75 
or Mind presiding in the world, acts by an instrument freely. Without 
instrumental and second causes there could be no regular course of na-
ture.76 And without a regular course, nature could never be understood; 
mankind must always be at a loss, not knowing what to expect, or how 
to govern themselves, or direct their actions for the obtaining of any end. 
Therefore in the government of the world physical agents, improperly (my 
 74 The degree to which the content of Siris should be regarded as Berkeley’s own 
philosophy may be a problem. On criticism of a unified continuation of Berkeley’s 
metaphysical system from the earlier works up to Siris, see Wilson 1994, 37–39. Berke-
ley at least had long prepared for the content of Siris, as he stated to his long-term 
friend Thomas Prior: ‘I had of a long time entertained an opinion agreeable to the 
sentiments of many ancient philosophers, that fire may be regarded as the animal 
spirit of this visible world’ (Four Letters and Farther Thoughts on Tar-water, ‘First Let-
ter’ § 16, Works V). Thus, I do not think that his long-lasting entertainment of ancient 
philosophies was independent of the whole of his philosophy, especially in Siris.
 75 This is originally the Stoic concept meaning the principle or life and action, 
the directing faculty or self-power of the divine and human minds, souls, or animate 
beings. See Baltzly 2018; Hutton 2017, 465–466, 479–481. On Berkeley’s positive ap-
preciation for Stoic psychology and cosmology from the earliest Notebooks to the latest 
(and most bizarre) Siris, see Breuninger 2010, 151; Daniel 2008, 207–219. On the view 
against mine, i.e. that Berkeley merely reports Stoicism and other ancient theories but 
shuts his own mouth in Siris, see Jessop, ‘Editor’s Introduction’ in Works V, 16. 
 76 Berkeley had held this point on the ‘regular course of nature’ in Principles 
30–31, 62; Jessop, Works V, 84, n. 3.
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emphasis) so called, or mechanical, or second causes, or natural causes, or 
instruments, are necessary to assist, not the Governor, but the governed. 
(Siris 160)
From here, one can see Berkeley arguing that the divine mind, as ‘τὸ 
ἡγεμονικόν’ (meaning ‘the hegemony’, ‘the directing/ruling principle’, 
or ‘the commanding faculty’),77 is assumed to freely exercise his own in-
strument (of his created nature) to will or direct the regular natural course. 
But also, human minds, as the secondary causes,78 necessarily use their 
instruments (or physical agents) to move their body parts in the ‘regular 
course of nature’. Hence, without these two kinds of instrumental cau-
sation, we humans are prone to be at a loss, missing ‘what to expect, or 
how to govern themselves’. Furthermore, as we read, the ‘Mind’ or God 
infinitely has his free or proper ἡγεμονικόν (directing principle). Besides 
the divine mind, however, I read that finite minds also make their own 
‘physical agents’ necessarily work (‘assist’) as their instruments, so that 
their minds could be their improper version of ἡγεμονικόν.79 
If my treatment is correct, this improper ἡγεμονικόν can be under-
stood as the human inferior or secondary principle of thinking, decid-
ing, and willing by means of their physical instrumental (mechanical) 
causes.80 This is because Berkeley argues that ‘it is the instrument by 
means whereof the mind exerts and manifests herself in the motions 
of the body’ (Siris 156). In moving the body parts, therefore, there is 
 77 See note 75 above.
 78 As to the secondary status of finite minds in relation to the divine first cause, 
I do not read concurrentism because the ‘instrumental and second causes’ of physical 
agents that human minds direct are ‘necessary to assist’ themselves or ‘the governed’ 
(Siris 160). This does not indicate the scholastic dogma of concurrence between the 
divine primary cause and creaturely secondary causes, but the creaturely immediate 
causes by their own instruments under the conservation by the divine free instru-
ment. Also in Siris, there are parallelisms between the ‘macrocosm’ (the world or 
universe moved by God) and ‘microcosms’ (the bodies of humans or living beings). 
‘Aether’ or ‘pure fire’ works in the macrocosm, whereas ‘animal spirits’ play the same 
role in the microcosms. See Moked 1988, 101–103; Wilson 1994, 50; Siris 153–161, 261 
(the animal spirit in the human body or microcosm is ‘only an instrument of motion, 
and the instrument not as a help to the Creator, but only as a sign to the creature’), 290 
(‘the soul of an animal’ has ‘its body … as an instrument’), 361 (the trinity of ‘Author-
ity, Life, and Light’ pervasively conserves the macrocosm and the microcosm).
 79 The ‘physical agents’ in this context indicate the ‘animal spirit’ in the human 
bodily microcosm as ‘the immediate physical cause of their motion’ (Siris 161). See 
also Siris 87, 166, 261 (‘particular voluntary motions to be impressed by the [human] 
mind on the animal spirit’).
 80 The instrumental causes directed by human minds in moving bodily animal 
spirits within themselves can be interpreted as anti-occasionalist (i.e. anti-Malebran-
chist) as well as non-concurrentist between the divine and creaturely acts of volition. 
See Moked 1988, 104–105.
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analogy between the human (‘governed’) mind and divine (‘Governor’) 
mind as for their respective principles of directing ἡγεμονικόν.81 In this 
analogical sense, therefore, the human mental faculty of willing as one’s 
particular directing principle ‘orders and moves the limbs’ in the acts 
of volition (Siris 161).
Accordingly, concerning the human volitional activities (including 
sinful actions in God’s eyes), moving one’s own body parts depends 
on the necessary control or self-power of the human mind, even under 
the governance of the divine mind. As construed from Siris 160–161, this 
is what Berkeley had consistently argued for the human mind-body cau-
sation under the proper sustenance of God, throughout his early to late 
works. This is why, therefore, I embrace the conservationist reading for 
the more viable interpretation of Berkeley than the occasionalist reading.
By contrast, the occasionalist reading could not integrate the above 
Siris interpretation into the occasionalist schema that humans causally 
depend on God for voluntary motion. From my points of view, those 
who interpret Berkeley to be an occasionalist (Jolley, Taylor, Bennett, 
et al.) fail to explain Berkeley’s remarks about the human mind having 
an inferior principle of motion. Their interpretations are rather determi-
nate in requiring no causal faculty to move any bodies for human minds 
in volitional acts. In accordance with the divine first and proper cause, 
however, the secondary causes directed by our minds can be operative 
instrumentally but improperly in our body parts. In other words, the 
conservationist reading supports the hegemonic role of human wills 
in bringing about the ideas of moving body parts, given and governed 
by the divine omnipotence. That is why Berkeley claims that ‘thinking 
rational beings’, namely we humans, are ‘in the production of motions’ 
by ‘the use of limited powers … immediately under the direction (my 
emphasis) of their own wills’ (Dialogues 3:237). This rather amounts to 
Berkeley’s consistent philosophical standpoint, which one can interpret 
in the sense of realism regarding the creaturely volitional power for di-
recting the motion in body parts.
To summarise, I specified the respective drawbacks in taking the 
two readings. As Baier and Ayers pointed out, it is true, Berkeley does 
not much elaborate on the causation between divine and human minds 
in willing and bringing about the effects (ideas) of physical motions. 
Then, the conservationist reading may be undermined when, as crea-
turely causation, it cannot identify the extent to which God causes real 
ideas of physical motions for human minds. Whereas the occasionalist 
reading is more problematic than the conservationist one when, in acts 
of volition, denying the creaturely secondary causes contradicts the ac-
tual (both sinful and natural) motions in the creaturely domain. In the 
 81 Moked 1988, 103; Siris 156, 161.
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end, I evaluate that the non-occasionalist or conservationist reading is 
more worthy than the occasionalist one because, from my final perspec-
tive, finite minds are supposed to improperly but necessarily direct the 
motions in body parts at will, or at their disposal, being under the proper 
conservation of God.
Conclusion
As a result, I have presented how to critically read Berkeley’s text con-
cerning the creaturely voluntary motion in body parts. Despite Berke-
ley’s disclaimer regarding the ‘very unaccountable and extravagant sup-
position’ of occasionalism (Principles 53), a number of interpreters still 
read his view of voluntary motion from an occasionalist perspective, 
as one’s volition is an occasional cause for God that produces the ef-
fects (real ideas) of motions. The occasionalist construal may be possible 
based on his ultimate account of the Pauline doctrine, in God we move 
(Acts 17:28), since ‘God is represented as the sole and immediate Author 
of all those effects’ (Dialogues 3:236). However, Berkeley argued that the 
human mind had ‘no other object, than barely the motion of the limbs 
of his body’, even though everything was being upheld by God (Prin-
ciples 147).
Hence, differing from the standard reading of Berkeley as an unqual-
ified occasionalist, I have advocated the greater feasibility of the alterna-
tive reading that he is a conservationist as regards voluntary motion, for 
which finite minds should be immediately responsible under the divine 
conservation. This reading converged upon the three points: (i) theod-
icy (human volitions, not God, causing sinful actions), (ii) the account 
of changing the sense modalities of other minds, and (iii) the hegemonic 
or directing principle stemming from the faculty in the human mind. 
There being more problems in discussing the relationship between voli-
tion, action, and motion in Berkeley, it could be concluded that the con-
servationist reading is textually and philosophically more tenable than 
the occasionalist one.82
 82 The author hereby expresses his gratitude for ungrudging and helpful com-
ments of Richard Brook, Kenneth Pearce, Peter West, Andrea Sangiacomo, Han 
Thomas Adriaenssen, and the anonymous reviewers for this journal. In addition, 
the comments of Jennifer Keefe (official commentator of this earlier version), Melissa 
Frankel, and many other Berkeley scholars (participants) in Margaret Atherton’s Mil-
waukee Berkeley Workshop (October 2018) were pricelessly beneficial. Lastly, as to 
this American trip, he is deeply indebted to the alumni of Trinity College Dublin for 
the generosity of their contribution to three sources of funding: the Provost’s PhD 
Project Award, the Graduate Studies Research Travel Fund, and the Trinity Trust 
Travel Grant Scheme.
95Berkeley on Voluntary Motion: A Conservationist Account
Bibliography
Ayers, Michael R. “Perception and Action.” In Knowledge and Necessity, edi-
ted by G.N.A. Vesey, 91–106. London: Macmillan, 1970. 
Ayers, Michael R. “Introduction.” In George Berkeley: Philosophical Works in-
cluding the Works of Vision, edited by Michael R. Ayers, xv–xl. London: 
Everyman, 1993.
Baier, Annette C. “The Intentionality of Intentions.” Review of Metaphysics 30, 
no. 3 (1977): 389–414. 
Baltzly, Dirk. “Stoicism”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018). Ac-
cessed 31 December 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/.
Bardout, Jean-Christophe. “Le modèle occasionnaliste. Emergence et déve-
loppement, au tournant des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles”. Quaestio 2 (2002): 
461–492. 
Bennett, Jonathan. Learning from Six Philosophers: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, 
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Belfrage, Bertil. “A New Approach to Berkeley’s Philosophical Notebooks.” In 
Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley, edited by Ernest Sosa, 217–230. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1987. 
Berkeley, George. The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. 9 vols, edited 
by A.A. Luce & T.E. Jessop. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1948–1957.
Berkeley, George. Philosophical Commentaries, edited by G.H. Thomas, with 
notes by A.A. Luce. Alliance, Ohio: Mount Union College, 1976.
Bracken, Harry. The Early Reception of Berkeley’s Immaterialism 1710–1733. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965. 
Breuninger, Scott. Recovering Bishop Berkeley: Virtue and Society in the Anglo-
-Irish Context. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Charles, Sébastien. “Berkeley occasionnaliste malgré lui? De la causalité et 
de la volonté chez Malebranche et Berkeley”. In Science et épistémologie 
selon Berkeley, edited by Sébastien Charles, 73–88. Saint-Nicolas, Québec: 
Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2004.
Dancy, Jonathan, ed. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Daniel, Stephen H. “Berkeley’s Pantheistic Discourse”. International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 49, no. 3 (2001): 179–194.
Daniel, Stephen H. “Berkeley’s Stoic Notion of Spiritual Substance”. In 
New Interpretation of Berkeley”s Thought, edited by Stephen H. Daniel, 
203–230. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2008. 
Downing, Lisa. “Occasionalism and Strict Mechanism: Malebranche, Ber-
keley, Fontenelle.” In Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Meta-
physics, edited by Christia Mercer and Eileen O”Neill, 206–230. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Ferrier, J.F. Institutes of Metaphysic (3rd ed., 1875). In Philosophical Works of Ja-
mes Frederick Ferrier, vol. 1, with an Introduction by John Haldane. Bri-
stol: Thoemmes Press, 2001.
96 Takaharu Oda
Falkenstein, Lorne. “Berkeley’s Argument for Other Minds”. History of Philo-
sophy Quarterly 7, no. 4 (1990): 431–440.
Fleming, Patrick. “Berkeley”s Immaterialist Account of Action.” Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 44, no. 3 (2006): 415–429. 
Frankel, Melissa. “Actions, Behaviours, and Volitions in Berkeley”s Moral 
Philosophy.” In Berkeley Revisited: Moral, Social and Political Philosophy, 
edited by Sébastien Charles, 99–114. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2015.
Freddoso, Alfred. “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Seconda-
ry Causation in Nature.” In Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Me-
taphysics of Theism, edited by Thomas V. Morris, 75–118. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1988. 
Freddoso, Alfred J. “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: 
Why Conservation is Not Enough.” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 
553–585. 
Freddoso, Alfred J. “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: 
Pitfalls and Prospects.” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 52 
(1994): 131–156. 
Fritz, Anita. “Berkeley’s Self – Its Origin in Malebranche.” Journal of the Histo-
ry of Ideas 15, no. 4 (1954): 554–572. 
Frost, Gloria. “Peter Olivi’s Rejection of God’s Concurrence with Created 
Causes.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22, no. 4 (2014): 
655–679. 
Grzeliński, Adam. “Alciphron; or the Minute Philosopher: Berkeley’s Redefini-
tion of Free-Thinking.” In The Bloomsbury Companion to Berkeley, edited 
by Bertil Belfrage and Richard Brook, 174–195. London: Bloomsbury, 
2017. 
Jesseph, Douglas M., ed. & trans. De Motu and The Analyst: A Modern Edition, 
with Introduction and Commentary. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992.
Jolley, Nicholas. “Berkeley and Malebranche on Causality and Volition.” In 
Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy: Essays Presented to Jonathan 
Bennett, edited by Jan A. Cover & Mark Klustad, 227–244. Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1990. 
Harris, James. “Berkeley on the Inward Evidence of Freedom.” In Berkeley’s 
Alciphron: English Text and Essays in Interpretation, edited by Laurent Jaf-
fro, Genevieve Brykman & Claire Schwartz, 341–350. Hildesheim: Georg 
Olms Verlag, 2010.
Hight, Marc A. “Berkeley’s Strange Semi-Occasionalist Mystery: Finite 
Minds as Causes.” In Occasionalism Revisited: New Essays from the Isla-
mic and Western Philosophical Traditions, edited by Nazif Muhtaroglu, 
197–218. Dubai: Kalam Research & Media, 2017. 
Hutton, Sarah. “Salving the Phenomena of Mind: Energy, Hegemonikon, and 
Sympathy in Cudworth.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25, 
no. 3 (2017): 465–486. 
97Berkeley on Voluntary Motion: A Conservationist Account
Keefe, Jennifer. “The Return to Berkeley.” British Journal for the History of Phi-
losophy 15, no. 1 (2007): 101–113. 
Lee, Sukjae. “Berkeley on the Activity of Spirits.” British Journal for the Histo-
ry of Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2012): 539–576. 
Luce, A.A. Berkeley and Malebranche: A Study in the Origins of Berkeley’s Tho-
ught. London: Clarendon Press, 1967.
Malebranche, Nicolas. The Search after Truth, translated & edited by Thomas 
M. Lennon & Paul J. Olscamp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997.
McDonough, Jeffrey K. “Berkeley, Human Agency and Divine Concurren-
tism.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 46, no. 4 (2008): 567–590. 
McKim, Robert. “Berkeley”s Notebooks”. In The Cambridge Companion to 
Berkeley, edited by Kenneth P. Winkler, 63–93. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
Moked, Gabriel. Particles and Ideas: Bishop Berkeley’s Corpuscularian Philoso-
phy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
Pitcher, George. “Berkeley on the Mind’s Activity.” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1981): 221–227.
Plantinga, Alvin. “Law, Cause, and Occasionalism.” In Reason and Faith: 
Themes from Richard Swinburne, edited by Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey 
E. Brower, 126–144. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Richmond, Alasdair. Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge: A Reader’s 
Guide. London: Continuum, 2009.
Roberts, John R. A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Roberts, John R. “‘Strange Impotence of Men’: Immaterialism, Anaemic 
Agents, and Immanent Causation.” British Journal for the History of Philo-
sophy 18, no. 3 (2010): 411–431.
Schmaltz, Tad M. Descartes on Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008.
Schmaltz, Tad M. “Nicolas Malebranche.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy (2017). Accessed 31 December 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/malebranche/.
Stoneham, Tom. Berkeley’s World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Stoneham, Tom. “Berkeley.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edi-
ted by Timothy O”Connor & Constantine Sandis, 496–504. Oxford: Wi-
ley-Blackwell, 2010. 
Stoneham, Tom. “Action, Knowledge and Embodiment in Berkeley and Loc-
ke.” In Philosophical Accounts of Action from Suarez to Davidson, edited by 
Constantine Sandis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Taylor, C.C.W. “Action and Inaction in Berkeley.” In Essays on Berkeley: 
A Tercentennial Celebration, edited by John Foster & Howard Robinson, 
211–225. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.
Wilson, Catherine, “Berkeley and the Microworld.” Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie 76, no. 1 (1994): 37–64.
98 Takaharu Oda
Summary
A plausible reading of Berkeley’s view of voluntary motion is occasionalism; 
this, however, leads to a specious conclusion against his argument of human 
action. Differing from an unqualified occasionalist reading, I consider the alter-
native reading that Berkeley is a conservationist regarding bodily motion by the 
human mind at will. That is, finite minds (spirits) immediately cause motions 
in their body parts, albeit under the divine conservation. My argument then 
comports with the conservationist reading from three perspectives: (i) theodicy 
that the human mind is held liable for sinful actions; (ii) an account of the hu-
man mind influencing other minds; and (iii) an improper but necessary directing 
principle of the human mind. This article is a stepping stone to grasping why the 
conservationist reading is more coherent than the occasionalist one.
Keywords: Berkeley, occasionalism, concurrentism, conservationism, volition, 
action, motion
Streszczenie
Berkeley o ruchu wolicjonalnym.  
Podejście konserwacjonistyczne
Pozornie słuszną interpretacją poglądów Berkeleya na temat ruchu wolicjonal-
nego jest okazjonalizm, jednakże prowadzi on do błędnych wniosków, które 
stoją w sprzeczności z jego wyjaśnieniem postępowania człowieka. Przeciwsta-
wiając się ogólnie pojmowanej interpretacji okazjonalistycznej, poddaję pod na-
mysł alternatywne odczytanie, zgodnie z którym odnośnie do poruszania przez 
człowieka swym ciałem Berkeley jest konserwacjonistą. Oznacza to, że skończo-
ny umysł (duch) wywołuje ruch członków swego ciała w sposób bezpośredni, 
jakkolwiek ruch ten jest zachowywany przez Boga. 
Moja argumentacja zgadza się zatem z konserwacjonizmem w trzech aspek-
tach: (i) teodycei, ludzki umysł jest bowiem odpowiedzialny za popełnianie 
grzechu; (ii) opisu, zgodnie z którym jeden ludzki umysł może wpływać na 
inny; (iii) niewłaściwej, ale koniecznej reguły nadającej kierunek decyzjom ludz-
kiego umysłu. Niniejszy artykuł powinien przyczynić się do wyjaśnienia, dla-
czego konserwacjonistyczna interpretacja filozofii Berkeleya jest bardziej spójna 
od okazjonalistycznej. 
Słowa kluczowe: Berkeley, okazjonalizm, konkurentyzm, konserwacjonizm, 
chcenie, działanie, ruch
